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CONCLUSION
The media, seemingly of its own accord, has generally adopted a more
tempered interpretation of the statutory prohibition on publications con-
cerning sexual offences. Besides being technically incorrect, the view that the
accused in a sexual offence may not be identiﬁed until he or she pleads has
over time resulted in the media displaying a misplaced deference to the
interests of the accused in such matters. Such deference is in direct conﬂict
with the principle of open justice and based on legislation that is most likely
unconstitutional. Besides, it is the result of something the legislature probably
never intended. But even more concerning is the fact that important media
institutions such as the South African National Editors’ Forum (through
certain statements in its book Reporting the Courts op cit) and the ofﬁce of the
Press Ombudsman (in one of its rulings discussed above) have on occasion
endorsed an extended application of an already doubtful practice, namely
that the accused in all criminal matters is entitled to anonymity until he or she
pleads.
Whilst the media generally appears to be sensitive to the prohibition on
identifying victims of sexual crimes, it follows an inconsistent approach to the
naming of those accused of such crimes. Many editors and reporters are no
doubt alive to the real aim of the prohibitions, demonstrated by media
reports actually naming the accused or containing statements to the effect
that the accused is not identified in order to protect the victim. Under the
circumstances, this approach appears to be the most consistent with statutory
and constitutional values. But until such time as the reach of s 154(2)(b) of the
Criminal Procedure Act is curtailed, it remains the law and a contravention
thereof may result in criminal liability. This unfortunate state of affairs will
endure until either the legislature steps in or some editor or journalist is
criminally charged, for only then would the opportunity arise to challenge
the constitutionality of s 154(2)(b).
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INTRODUCTION
‘In my view s 55(1) is no more than a statutory means of conferring such power
upon municipal managers to attend to the affairs of the municipality on behalf
of the municipal council. There is no basis for construing the section as
simultaneously divesting the municipal council of any of its executive powers.
Indeed, as I have already pointed out, the Constitution vests all executive
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authority — which includes the authority to appoint staff — in the municipal
council and legislation is not capable of lawfully divesting it of that power.’
(Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality [2011] 3 All SA 140 (SCA) para
17 (hereafter Manana).
The Local Government: Municipal SystemsAct 32 of 2000 (hereafter ‘the
Municipal Systems Act’) provides that the municipal manager is responsible
for the appointment of staff, other than managers that report directly to the
municipal manager (the so-called section 56 managers), in a municipality
(s 55(1)(e) of the Municipal Systems Act). This is signiﬁcant given that the
municipal manager is the head of the municipal administration and also the
accounting ofﬁcer for the municipality (s 82(1)(a) of the Local Government:
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (hereafter ‘the Municipal Structures
Act’), s 55(1) and (2) of the Municipal Systems Act and s 60 of the Local
Government: Municipal Finance ManagementAct 56 of 2003 (hereafter ‘the
MFMA’)). Political interference in the recruitment and appointment pro-
cesses undermines this framework and has been cited as one of the reasons for
the dysfunction at local government (Department of Co-operative Gover-
nance State of Local Government Report (2009) 67).
As the State of Local Government Report reveals, councillors of the Mnquma
Local Municipality in the Eastern Cape had recruited the majority of the
workforce in a manner that ﬂouted the procedures and policies of sound
human resource practices (ibid). The Report reveals yet another instance of
political interference in the recruitment and appointment process. In one
municipality, a former tea-lady was promoted to become its Chief Financial
Ofﬁcer (ibid at 39).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Manana seems to suggest
that the power to appoint staff, other than section 56 managers, vests in the
municipal council. This means that the municipal manager is simply an agent
of the municipal council when it comes to the appointment of staff and that
the municipal council can, at any time, decide to recruit and appoint staff
itself. In this case note I argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal was wrong
in its interpretation.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts that gave rise to the issue under discussion are as follows. Mr
Manana was formerly employed by Umtata Transitional Council as a legal
advisor before the council merged with the Mqanduli Transitional Council
to form the King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality in 2000. The new
municipal council (King Sabata Dalindyebo) resolved to appoint Mr Manana
as manager of the legal services department and to adjust his salary
accordingly. He was notiﬁed of this appointment in a letter addressed to him
by the acting director of corporate services. He signed the letter of
appointment the following day, signifying his acceptance. However, his
salary was not adjusted to reﬂect his new position. He addressed a letter to the
acting director of corporate services communicating this fact, but no action
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was taken to resolve the matter. He then, through his attorney, wrote to the
municipality demanding the adjustment of his salary in line with his
promotion.
The municipal manager responded and referred Mr Manana to an
intervention by the MEC for Housing, Local Government and Traditional
Affairs, which sought to investigate acts of maladministration and irregulari-
ties in the municipality. The municipal manager advised him that his
purported appointment was the subject of review and therefore appealed for
his patience while this review was carried out. However, when the
municipality failed, after three months, to adjust his salary in accordance with
the resolution that promoted him, Mr Manana initiated proceedings in the
Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, asking for an order directing the
municipality to make the appropriate adjustments to his salary and to pay the
moneys due to him as a result of his appointment. The court dismissed the
claim on the basis that it was a labour issue over which it had no jurisdiction.
Mr Manana then appealed to the Supreme Court ofAppeal.
The respondent municipality’s evidence on appeal was provided by Ms
Zitumane, a caretaker municipal manager appointed to investigate the
allegations of irregularities in the municipality. In opposing the appeal, she
contended, ﬁrst, that effect should not be given to the resolution to promote
Mr Manana as it was passed irregularly, in ‘that the ‘‘ruling’’ referred to in the
resolution — which purported to ‘‘rule’’ that Mr Manana be appointed to the
post — was ‘‘concocted’’ to induce the municipal council to make the
appointment’ (Manana para 19). She further contended that the resolution
was in conﬂict with the municipality’s employment policy. Essentially, the
municipality argued that the resolution to promote Mr Manana was invalid
and not binding upon it.
Secondly, she argued that the power to appoint employees was not vested
in the municipal council but in the municipal manager and cited s 55(1)(a)–
(e) of the Municipal Systems Act. Counsel for the municipality speciﬁcally
relied on subsec (e), which provides: ‘As head of administration the municipal
manager of a municipality is, subject to the policy direction of the municipal
council, responsible and accountable for [. . .] the appointment of staff . . .’
(Manana para 15).
DECISION
The court in Manana held that the municipal council resolution that
employed Mr Manana as manager of legal services was valid, as the executive
power to hire staff for a municipality is vested in the municipal council in
terms of s 151(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
(Manana para 13). It stated that s 55(1) of the Municipal Systems Act is no
more than a statutory means of conferring on the municipal manager the
power to attend to the affairs of the municipality on behalf of the council.
The Act does not, and cannot, divest a municipal council of the powers
vested in it by the Constitution (Manana paras 14 and 17).
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The court went on to say that the Constitution vests all executive
authority — which includes the authority to appoint staff — in the municipal
council, and legislation is not capable of lawfully divesting it of that power.
To the extent that there might be any ambiguity in a statute in that respect, it
must be construed to avoid that result (Manana para 17). The court further
noted that the fact that the letter was written by the acting director of
corporate services and not the municipal manager did not invalidate it, as it is
the municipal council itself that made the appointment, and the acting
director of corporate services did no more than execute the resolution
administratively (Manana para 18).
On the issue of invalidity of the resolution — the argument raised by the
caretaker municipal manager — the court stated that no authority had been
offered for the submission that a duly adopted resolution of a local authority
might be ignored by its ofﬁcials if they believe it to be invalid, even if that
belief was well-founded. The court added that it would be high problematic
if public administration ofﬁcials were entitled to choose between executing
or not executing a duly adopted resolution of the council, depending upon
their belief as to its validity, and whether or not the belief was well-founded.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
A municipality’s autonomy over personnel affairs sets it apart from the other
spheres of government that are part of the single public service ‘which must
function and be structured in terms of the national legislation’ (s 197(1) of the
Constitution). In the provincial and national spheres of government, the
terms and conditions of employment for all employees are governed by
national legislation. This means that the recruitment, appointment, promo-
tion, transfer and dismissal of provincial and national staff must occur within a
uniform national framework (s 197(4) of the Constitution). As for munici-
palities, the Constitution stipulates that a municipal council makes decisions
concerning the exercise of all powers and functions of the municipality
(s 160(1)(a)). In the same vein, it provides that the municipal council may
employ the personnel it needs for the effective performance of its functions
(s 160(1)(d)).
The Constitution does not separate municipal legislative and executive
authority (s 151(2)(c)). In essence, there is an absence of classical separation of
powers in the structure of municipalities. Much is left to the municipal
council in terms of its right to structure and organise its internal functioning
(N Steytler & J de Visser Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 8-10).
However, s 155(7) of the Constitution enjoins the national and provincial
governments to regulate the exercise by municipalities of their executive
authority in order to ensure that municipalities perform their functions
effectively. To this end, the national government, through the Municipal
Systems Act, the Municipal Structures Act and the MFMA, sets out the
parameters within which municipalities can exercise the right to regulate
their internal affairs, particularly by allocating powers to the various compo-
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nents or functionaries of the municipality. The question that arises is whether
national legislation may regulate the administration of a municipality by
excluding the municipal council’s power to effect certain appointments. In
this regard, the Municipal Systems Act, the interpretation of which was at
issue in Manana, will be analysed in this note.
POWERS OF SUPERVISION
The Constitution empowers the upper spheres of government to play the
important role of supervising local government in the performance if its
functions. The supervision of local government takes different forms, namely
regulation (s 155(7) of the Constitution), monitoring and support (s 155(6)
of the Constitution), and intervention (s 139 of the Constitution). The
Constitutional Court in The Executive Council of the Province of the Western
Cape v The Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development &
another; The Executive Council of KwaZulu-Natal v The President of the Republic
of South Africa & another 2001 (1) SA 661 (CC) held that the autonomy of
local government to regulate its internal affairs is subject to, and therefore its
ambit is constrained by, the provisions of the Constitution, which
‘include section 154(1) (national and provincial governments must support and
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs), section
155(7) (national and provincial governments have the power to ensure that
municipalities perform their executive functions effectively), section 155(6)(a)
(power of provincial government to monitor and support local governments
and to promote their development to enhance their ability to manage their own
affairs), section 160(1)(c) (power of municipalities to appoint committees is
subject to national legislation) and section 160(8) (right of members of a
municipal council to participate in its proceedings and those of its committees
may be regulated by national legislation)’ (para 98).
In this case, the Constitutional Court was concerned with the constitu-
tional challenge to a number of provisions of the Municipal StructuresAct by
the provincial governments of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal
respectively. In particular, the two provinces contended that the Municipal
Structures Act encroached on the constitutional powers of municipalities.
This challenge related speciﬁcally to a municipal council’s power to elect
executive committees or other committees in violation of s 160(1)(c) of the
Constitution and its power to regulate its internal affairs in terms of s 160(6)
of the Constitution. In relation to the latter, the court held that the
Constitution places substantial constraints on municipal autonomy in respect
of internal arrangements (Executive Council Western Cape (supra) para 98), as
reﬂected in the extract quoted above.
Of importance for present purposes is the constitutional limit on the
autonomy of local government to regulate its internal affairs, and in the
power of the national government to ‘regulate’ the exercise by municipalities
of their executive authority (in terms of s 155(7) of the Constitution).
Regulation is a form of supervision by the upper spheres of government that
sets the necessary framework within which local government functions can
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responsibly be exercised. In the First Certification judgment, the Constitu-
tional Court held the term ‘regulate’ to mean ‘a broad managing or
controlling rather than a direct authorisation function’ (Ex Parte Chairperson
of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 377). In essence, it is
impermissible for the national government to prescribe detail when exercis-
ing its power to regulate. Its role is limited to setting the framework and
leaving the details to the municipal councils.
THE MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT
The municipal council must appoint the municipal manager who, as stated
earlier, is the head of the municipal administration and is also the accounting
ofﬁcer for the municipality (s 82(1)(a) and (b) of the Municipal Structures
Act, s 55(1) of the Municipal Systems Act and s 60 of the MFMA). The
pivotal role of the municipal manager in the functioning of the municipality
was highlighted by the Constitutional Court in Executive Council Western
Cape as ‘a key structure of a municipality and not merely a personnel
appointment as contemplated in s 160(1)(d) of the Constitution’ (Executive
Council Western Cape (supra) para 109). The municipal manager is the primary
interface between political structures and ofﬁce-bearers, on the one hand,
and the municipal administration, on the other hand (Steytler & De Visser op
cit at 8-22(1)). He or she is the custodian of all records and documents of a
municipality (s 117 of the Municipal SystemsAct).
The municipal manager as head of administration
Section 55 of the Municipal SystemsAct provides a framework for the duties
of the municipal manager, subject to the policy directions of the municipal
council. In this regard, the municipal council’s role is to formulate and
enforce the policy for the municipality to guide the implementation of these
duties by the municipal manager. In essence, the municipal council is not
completely excluded from the exercise of s 55 powers. In fact, the municipal
manager exercises these powers under the supervision of the municipal
council as the municipal manager is subject to the policy directions of the
council.
In terms of this framework, the municipal manager is responsible for the
formation and development of an administration that is economical, effec-
tive, efﬁcient and accountable (s 55(1)(a) of the Municipal SystemsAct). This
administration must be managed by the municipal manager in accordance
with the Municipal Systems Act and other legislation applicable to the
municipality (s 55(1)(b) of the Municipal SystemsAct). Most importantly, the
municipal manager is responsible for ensuring that the staff, other than the
managers directly accountable to him, are appointed to the municipal
administration subject to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (s 55(1)(e)
of the Municipal SystemsAct).
Section 66(1) of the Municipal SystemsAct, in turn, enjoins the municipal
council to determine a policy framework to enable the municipal manager to
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exercise certain duties relating to the staff establishment, such as: (a) the
approval of a staff establishment for the municipality; (b) the provision of a
job description for each post on the staff establishment; (c) the attachment of
remuneration and any conditions of employment to each post in accordance
with any applicable labour legislation; and (d) the establishment of a process
or mechanism to evaluate regularly the staff establishment and, if necessary, to
review it (s 16(1)(a)–(d) of the Municipal SystemsAct).
The powers of the municipal manager contained in ss 55 and 66 are
derived directly from the statute and are not delegated by the municipal
council. Municipal councils normally delegate powers and functions to the
municipal manager, and he or she generally performs such delegated
functions or exercises such delegated powers (s 55(1)(m) and (q) of the
Municipal SystemsAct). It is important to note that such delegation does not
divest the council of the responsibility for the exercise of the power or the
performance of the duty (s 59(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act). There-
fore, the municipal council, as the delegating authority, can revoke or
withdraw delegated powers in accordance with its system of delegation
(s 59(1)(c) of the Municipal Systems Act). However, this is not the case with
ss 55 and 66 powers. These are not delegated powers and, as a result, the
municipal council cannot divest the municipal manager of these powers. The
council does not have claims in respect of these powers. Its role is limited to
overseeing and supervising the exercise thereof.
The municipal manager as the accounting officer
Section 55(2) of the Municipal Systems Act contains the duties of the
municipal manager in his or her role as the accounting ofﬁcer of a
municipality. The municipal manager is responsible and accountable for all
the income and expenditure of the municipality, all its assets and the
discharge of all its liabilities, as well as for the proper and diligent compliance
with the MFMA (s 55(2)(a)–(c) of the Municipal Systems Act). Similarly, the
MFMA confers certain duties on the municipal manager as the accounting
ofﬁcer. These relate to general ﬁnancial management functions, assets and
liability management, revenue management, expenditure management in
general, expenditure on staff beneﬁts, and so forth (ss 60–75 of the MFMA).
Similarly, these duties are not delegated by the municipal council. They are
derived directly from the statute, and as such cannot be revoked or
withdrawn by the municipal council. However, these powers must be
exercised subject to the policy directions of the municipal council.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Manana had to contend with two issues.
The ﬁrst was whether or not ofﬁcials can ignore council resolutions
whenever they believe such resolutions to be invalid. The Supreme Court of
Appeal was correct in holding that ofﬁcials cannot do so. The court could not
condone ofﬁcials second-guessing council resolutions. Ofﬁcials who doubt
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the validity of a resolution should query the matter, or ask the council to
rescind its resolution, but may not simply ignore it.Alternatively, they should
ask a court to declare the resolution invalid.
The second issue was whether s 55 of the Municipal Systems Act
constrains the council’s executive powers in favour of the municipal
manager. The court appeared to suggest that no statute can really limit the
council’s powers in favour of other organs within the municipality. I ﬁnd this
view problematic for the reasons that are discussed below.
National regulation
As noted above, s 155(7) of the Constitution permits the national govern-
ment to regulate the exercise by municipal councils of their executive
functions. If such regulation states that certain tasks are to be performed by
the municipal manager, this limitation is based on the Constitution and is
valid. Section 55 of the Municipal Systems Act is legislation of this kind,
which regulates the exercise of the executive powers of a municipal council
relating to the appointment of the personnel it needs for the effective
performance of its functions. This, therefore, gives rise to the question
whether or not s 55 exceeds the boundaries of regulation. My view is that it
does not. As noted earlier, the power to appoint remains vested in the
municipality. The council provides the policy framework, while the munici-
pal manager makes the actual decisions. Moreover, the council exercises
control over the municipal manager’s exercise of his or her s 55 duties, and
thus failure to comply with its policies can be sanctioned. Furthermore, only
less important positions are at stake; all s 56 appointments fall squarely within
the control of the council.
The practical implication of the court’s view
The practical consequence of the court’s ﬁnding might compromise sound
and stable municipal governance. First, it causes confusion regarding the
powers of the municipal council to appoint personnel. This is the case in so
far as it gives the municipal council the right to claim a speciﬁc authority to
make individual appointments. Some councils might want to claim the
powers conferred on the municipal manager by the Municipal Systems Act.
Armed with this judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal, some councils
might even adopt a resolution purporting to revoke the powers of the
municipal manager relating to the appointment of staff, and may decide to
appoint all staff by council resolution.
This has the potential to compromise the position of the municipal
manager. As the head of the administration, the municipal manager is
answerable for his or her administration. As such, the municipal manager
should have the task of appointing, dismissing and disciplining his or her staff.
Should councillors arrogate the power to themselves, the municipal manager
would be exposed to increasing insubordination on the part of his or her staff
since they had not been appointed by him or her, and would feel that they
were responsible to the council alone.
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Secondly, individual councillors may use this interpretation to justify their
interference in the appointment of staff. As noted earlier, this would create
fertile ground for corruption. Some councillors would appoint their
acquaintances irrespective of whether they have the requisite qualiﬁcations,
experience and competence.
Comparative provisions
Local government legislation is replete with provisions that constrain a
council’s executive powers. Some of them have even been sanctioned by the
Constitutional Court. In this regard, the Constitutional Court judgment in
Executive Council Western Cape made it clear that the Constitution places
substantial constraints on municipal autonomy over internal arrangements
(see Steytler & De Visser op cit at 3–30). The municipality’s legislative power
to regulate internal affairs was interpreted as a power with a relatively narrow
scope (Executive Council Western Cape (supra) para 101).
Another example of a regulation that constrains a council’s executive
powers is s 117 of the MFMA, which excludes the council and councillors
from procurement decisions. The MFMA draws a clear distinction between
the policy aspects of supply chain management and the implementation of
the system (National Treasury Supply Chain Management: A Guide for
Accounting Officers of Municipalities and Municipal Entities (2005) 16). The
development and adoption of the supply chain management policy is the
responsibility of the council. Once adopted, the implementation of the
policy is the prerogative of the municipal manager. This much was made
clear in the case of Ortlieb and Associates vs Camdeboo Local Municipal Council
2005 JDR 0408 (E), where the court set aside the award of a bid because a
councillor chaired the bid committee. In this case, the court was concerned
with an application by a disgruntled bidder for an order setting aside the
award of a tender, on the basis that a councillor acted as the chairman of the
bid committee in contravention of section 117 of the MFMA. After
disposing of the preliminary points, Pickering J held (ibid at 13): ‘[T]he
provisions of section 117 of the MFMA were violated by the presence of
seventh respondent as chairman of the committee dealing with the tender
bids.’ He went on to declare the proceedings of the bid committee a nullity,
and set aside the award.
Similarly, the role of the council and councillors in the appointment of
staff should be limited to the development and adoption of a recruitment
policy. They should not be involved in staff appointments, which is the
implementation of policies. There are contextual similarities between supply
chain management and human resource management and they both have a
propensity to attract political interference. The State of Local Government
Report (op cit at 72), for example, mentions the problem of political
interference in staff appointments and procurement decisions as the root
cause of the dysfunction at local government level. The principle laid down
in Ortlieb and Associates (supra) must therefore also be followed with regard to
individual staff appointments.
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CONCLUSION
The decision in Manana is based on the notion of the absence of separation of
powers in the municipal council set-up. The Supreme Court of Appeal
found s 55(1)(e) of the Municipal Systems Act of little import in that it does
not compel the municipality to ensure that the municipal manager makes
individual staff appointments with respect to staff other than s 56 staff. The
Supreme Court of Appeal did not see s 55(1)(e) of the Municipal SystemsAct
as placing a barrier between the council and the administration when it
comes to individual staff appointments.
What the Systems Act seeks to do in s 55 is not to prescribe the details of
what municipalities should do, but rather to provide a framework within
which municipal councils must operate. The comments of the court to the
effect that an Act of Parliament cannot change the fact that the council has
both legislative and executive authority should not be interpreted to
constrain Parliament in this matter. National government is permitted by the
Constitution to regulate the exercise by a municipality of its executive
authority, and s 55 falls squarely within the concept of ‘regulation’.
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